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Abstract— Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) are increas-
ingly used in military tactical situations and in civil rapid-
deployment networks, including emergency rescue operations
and ad hoc disaster-relief networks. The flexibility of MANETs
comes at a price, when compared to wired and basestation-
based wireless networks: MANETs are susceptible to both insider
(compromised node) and outsider attacks due to the lack of a
well-defined perimeter in which to deploy firewalls, intrusion
detection systems, and other mechanisms commonly used for
network access and admission control.
In this paper, we define a distributed firewall architecture that
is designed specifically for MANETs. Our approach harnesses
and extends the concept of a network capability, and is especially
suited for environments where the communicating nodes have
different roles and hence different communication requirements,
such as in tactical networks. Our model enforces communication
restrictions among MANET nodes and services, allowing hop-
by-hop policy enforcement in a distributed manner. We use a
“deny-by-default” model where compromised nodes have access
only to authorized services, without the ability to disrupt or
interfere with end-to-end service connectivity and nodes beyond
their local communication radius. Our simulations show that our
solution has minimal overhead in terms of bandwidth and latency,
works well even in the presence of routing changes due to mobile
nodes, and is effective in containing misbehaving nodes.
Keywords: MANETs, Capabilities, Distributed Firewall
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in low power computing and communica-
tions have led to the proliferation of handheld and portable
devices equipped with wireless connectivity. These mobile
wireless devices appear to be ideal for situations where fixed
infrastructure would be too costly or dangerous to deploy,
or has been rendered inoperable. However, because of radio
power consumption, physical obstacles, and channel capacity,
a mobile node may not be able to reach all other nodes
within a single broadcast. Therefore, to achieve end-to-end
connectivity, nodes have to form mobile ad-hoc wireless
networks (MANETs) which allow data to be routed through
intermediate nodes. MANETs are fundamentally different than
Internet because all peers act as both sources and routers using
the other participants to relay packets to their final destination.
Due to their flexibility, MANETs are currently employed in
both military and commercial applications.
Unfortunately, not all MANET nodes are equally capable,
nor can all users be equally trusted. Worse yet, mobile nodes
in tactical environments run the danger of being captured or
malfunctioning. In current systems, even a small number of
misbehaving nodes can successfully compromise the entire
MANET: malicious peers can transmit excessive packets, ex-
hausting all network and power resources of other participants
through a Denial of Services (DoS) attack.
In traditional networks, malicious nodes and traffic are
kept away from a set of nodes belonging to an organization
or a group using firewalls. This is feasible because of the
existence of a well defined network perimeter. All incoming
and outgoing traffic needs to transit through these firewall
nodes, which enforce the policies at the perimeter. Even within
the perimeter smaller sub-groups can have more stringent
policies by deploying their own firewalls. Unfortunately, the
concept of a network perimeter does not exist in MANETs,
and policies need to be enforced in a distributed manner while
taking into consideration node mobility.
To amend this, we enforce trust relationships and traffic
accountability between mobile nodes by introducing a novel
policy enforcement architecture that is designed specifically
for MANETs. We extend the network capability framework
[23], [3] and we tailor it for an ad-hoc resource-constrained
mobile environment. Capability is a token of authority that
has associated rights. In our model, capabilities propagate
both access control rules and traffic-shaping parameters that
should govern a node’s traffic. We define a protocol for
transmitting capabilities (which are treated as soft state) across
the MANET.
Our architecture enables the enforcement of adaptive band-
width constraints inside the network denying by default unau-
thorized traffic. Such policy helps to mitigate the impact of
denial of service (DoS) attacks because excess or unauthorized
packets are dropped closer to the attack source. Thus, we
avoid unnecessary data processing and forwarding at the
target node and the network itself. Moreover, nodes can only
access the services and hosts they are authorized for by the
capabilities given to them. Thus, compromised or malicious
nodes cannot exceed their authority and expose the whole
network to an adversary. Upon detection, a compromised node
can be prevented from further attacking the network simply by
revoking its capabilities.
To evaluate the performance of our scheme, we performed
extensive simulations using GloMoSim [1]. Because Glo-
MoSim did not include any packet checking functionality, we
extended its models to adding another layer between the IP
and the AODV routing where we implemented the capabilities.
Since our enforcement mechanism has provable protection
properties, our primary concern was the network overhead
of our scheme given the cryptographic operations required.
Therefore, we focused our measurements on comparing the
packet latency and bandwidth with and without our system in
a variety of mobility scenarios and topologies. We discovered
that our scheme imposes an 8% overhead on the end-to-end
latency and a 5% drop on available bandwidth. We believe that
this is not a high price to pay given that there are scenarios
that the MANET becomes completely unusable even when a
single node misbehaves.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by
describing the threat model in Section II. We then present the
system architecture and a high-level overview of our scheme,
including the security analysis, in Section III, and the details
of the protocol in Section IV. We evaluate our architecture
through simulation, with results given in Section V. Related
work is discussed in Section VI.
II. THREAT MODEL
In our threat model, we assume MANET environments
where an adversary may be an existing node that is com-
promised (insider) or a malicious external node that might
want to participate in the MANET. Furthermore, there may
be multiple adversaries, and they can cooperate. In addition,
compromised nodes may not be detected as such immediately,
or ever (depending on their actions).
Our goal is to protect network resources and end-node
services from denial of service attacks, and to enforce access
control rules in the absence of a fixed topology. We want a
node to access only the services it is entitled to; we want to
restrict both the type and quantity of the service and filter the
unauthorized traffic early on the path to preserve resources.
The resources needed to access a service are allocated by
the group controller(s) of the MANET. Group controllers are
nodes responsible to maintain the group membership for a
set of MANET nodes and authorize multicast communications
within the group. Without compromising a group server, an
external node can participate in a MANET only by stealing
the authorization credentials that are bound to the identity of
a compromised node.
If a node is compromised, an adversary can only access the
services and bandwidth that node is authorized to access. A
compromised node does not have ability to disrupt or interfere
with end-to-end service connectivity and nodes beyond its
local radio communication radius. The nodes providing the
services will receive only the traffic that node or the group
server has allocated it to be received, unless the adversary is
in the communication radius.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In our architecture, there is one or more pre-defined nodes
that act as a group controller. These nodes are trusted by all
the group nodes. For the purpose of simplicity and without
loss of generality, we will assume that all the MANET nodes
are part of a single group. A group controller has authority
to assign resources to the nodes in MANET. These resources
are expressed in terms of limits on the number of packets or
on bandwidth rates that a MANET participant is permitted
to transmit destined for a service running on another node.
The resource allocation by the group controller to a node is
represented using a certificate that all the nodes can verify.
This resource allocation is called forward capability. When a
node (initiator) requests a service from a MANET node (re-
sponder) using the forward capability assigned to the initiator,
the responder can provide capability back to the initiator. This
is called receiver capability, and it is generated based on the
resource policy of the system.
All the nodes in the path from an initiator to a responder
(i.e., nodes relaying the packets) are required to enforce
and abide by the resource allocation done by the group
authority. The enforcement involves both firewall rules as
well as bandwidth allocation of the capability. A responder
node accepts the packets from an initiator only if the initiator
has authorization to send in the form of a capability. An
intermediate node will forward the packets from a node only
if the packets have an associated capability, and if they do not
violate the capability. Note that the packets do not have to
physically contain the capability. The nodes should be able to
identify them with the capability, as we explain later in this
section.
To enforce that the packets are forwarded only if they have
capability associated with it, the intermediate nodes keep track
of the capabilities of the data transfer that is transiting through
it. These capabilities are maintained in the capability database.
The details of the capability database are given in Section IV.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the protocol when an initiator
(user) wants to get a service from a responder (server). The
initiator has a forward capability issued by the group server
that authorizes the communication with the responder. The
initiator sends a communication request and an optional initial
data, along with its forward capability to the responder. This
packet also contains a transaction id that the initiator will use
for subsequent communication. The packet may also contain
a receiver capability the initiator generates that can be used
by the responder to communicate back to the initiator. Here
we assume that the initiator has a routing table entry for
the responder. Otherwise the underlying routing protocol will
be invoked to get the route. When the packet reaches the
intermediate node, it will forward the packet after validating
the packet. The validation involves cryptographic verification
of the capability, and verification of the constraints (e.g.
bandwidth usage, service and destination address) specified in
the capability. If the validation is successful, the intermediate
node also records the capability in its capability database,
along with other attributes of the packets like source and
destination node address and the transaction id.
The responder, on receiving the packet verifies the capability
and creates a receiver capability for the initiator. The responder
sends the response to the request as well as the newly created
receiver capability for the initiator. The responder also creates
a transaction id for the communication, and includes it in
the response. The responder also needs to include a capa-
bility, which authorizes it to communicate with the initiator.
This capability can be either the receiver capability for the
responder the initiator had sent in the first packet, or the
forward capability issued by the group server authorizing
the communication with the initiator. The intermediate node,
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Fig. 1. System overview
on receiving this packet from the responder, validates the
packet and adds the capability to its capability database. In
the diagram, the reverse path is shown to be different from
the forward path. The paths can also be same in-practice.
Initiator can optionally send the receiver capability it received
from the responder in the forward path. In that case, the
intermediate nodes will update its capability database with the
new capability.
Any further data traffic between the initiator and the re-
sponder does not contain the capability, but it contains only the
transaction id that was included in the initial handshake as well
as a signature that can be verified by the intermediate nodes.
The intermediate nodes can validate the packets by looking at
the capability contained in the capability database correspond-
ing to the transaction id in the packet. This validation involves
making sure that the packet does not exceed the resource limit
allowed in the capability as well as probabilistically verifying
the packet signature. For this validation, the intermediate node
also maintains the resource usage against each capability in its
capability database. The only time the initiator or responder
need to re-send the capability is when the path between them
changes due to mobility of the nodes, or for refreshing the
capability periodically.
We note that our solution can be used to protect multicast
traffic and routing control packets. We omit the details due to
lack of space.
A. Memory and CPU available per packets in MANETS
We argue that the proposed solution is feasible for
MANETs, even though the memory and processing power
are lower in MANET nodes compared to routers in wired
networks. And our scheme requires memory to store the
information about the traffic sessions and processing power to
do public key operations. The feasibility comes from the fact
that the bandwidth of MANET is significantly less compared
to that of wired network. The available memory or processing
power per packet is higher in MANET compared to that of
wired network. It is possible to do public key operations on
one in every few packets on MANETs today. The processing
power per packet for MANET nodes are increasing everyday
with the advent of faster but less power hungry processors for
portable devices.
The public key operations for verifying that a packet belongs
to a capability can be achieved with very small key sizes. This
is because, unlike traditional use of public keys, the keys are
useful only for the short duration of the session. For longer
sessions, new keys can be generated and old ones discarded.
B. Capability definition
Each node has authority to send traffic to its peers at certain
rates. These are represented by KeyNote-style credentials [4].
These capabilities are assigned by a central authority. The
credential contains
1. Identity of the node (principal)
2. (Optional) identity of the destination node.
3. Type of service and amount of data the principal is allowed
to send.
4. Signature of the group server
All the nodes in the MANET know the public key of
the group servers, so that they can verify the capabilities.
Destination node can be a host or a subnet. Type of service is
the protocols this capability can access. The amount of data
that can be sent can be represented as various constraints on
the packet rates that can be verified by a node.
Typically the bandwidth available to a node on a receiver
capability is more than that of its forward capability. This is
because receiver capabilities are negotiated by the communi-
cation parties and the communication parties are free to assign
as much as it like within the policy, provided they can process
them. Where as forward capabilities are assigned by the central
authority and it does not know about the load on the node when
communication takes place. Hence the central authority will
consider the worst case scenario while assigning the forward
capability. Also if the forward capabilities were larger than the
receiver capabilities received by the sender, then the sender has
no motivation for using the receiver capability.
Forward and receiver capabilities have the same syntactic










The above represents a forward capability assigned by the
captain.nj.army.mil to the unit number 1. The unit can use
this capability to send the traffic to any node in the domain
nj.army.mil. The instantaneous data rate using this capability
cannot exceed 50kbps.
If unit 1 wants to communicate with unit 2, it will send a
message to unit 2 using this forward capability. The unit 2 will
issue a receiver capability for the unit 1, if the communication







comment: Policy allowing the receiver
to issue this capability.
signature: sig-rsa 238769789789898
This capability is restricted to be used only by unit 1 for
communication with unit 2. This has a higher bandwidth, but
a shorter expiration date. The issuer of the capability is the
same as the destination of the capability.
After receiving this capability, unit 1 will use this capability
for communication with unit 2. Since the new capability has
higher bandwidth, unit 1 will be able to do the intended
communication. The more general forward capability can now
be used by unit 1 for communicating with other nodes.
If the communication from unit 1 to unit 2 was short and low
bandwidth, unit 1 could have used its forward capability for the
entire duration of the communication, with out requesting for a
receiver capability from the unit 2. This will be faster for short
communication as there is no capability request/reply and unit
2 does not have to issue any capabilities. If unit 1 expects some
messages from unit 2 that requires more capabilities than the
one that is available with unit 2 in form of forward capability,
then unit 1 could issue a receiver capability for unit 2.
C. Security Analysis
We now discuss how our architecture relates to the threat
model described in Section II.
Since the capabilities are signed by a group server and
are verifiable by the nodes, adversaries cannot generate their
own valid capabilities. Adversaries can create valid capabilities
only if the group server is compromised. Since the individual
packets are signed, an adversary cannot use a transaction ID
that does not belong to it to send the packets.
A compromised node that does not enforce the capability
protocol can only have impact within its communication
radius. A compromised node can only access the services it is
authorized to. Packets of nodes trying to use more bandwidth
than allocated will be rejected. A malicious node frequently
doing this can be detected and isolated.
A receiver can protect against DoS attacks by controlling the
issuance of receiver capabilities to its communicating peers.
A malicious node can use its forward/receiver capabilities to
send duplicate packets in multiple disjoint paths; we do not
currently protect against this attack, which allows a node to
transmit more traffic that it is authorized to. We note, however,
that local nodes in the radio perimeter of the misbehaving node
can detect this scenario.
IV. PROTOCOL DETAILS
Depending on the stage of communication, a MANET
source node can transmit either data packets or control packets
to a destination node. These packets are routed by the underly-
ing MANET routing protocol, which could be AODV, DSR, or
any other mobile routing protocol. However, for those packets
to be routed, the source node should have in its possession a
capability token in the form of forward or receiver capability.
Thus, an intermediate node forwards a packet or the receiving
node accepts a packet only if there is a capability associated
with the packet. To prevent excessive communication overhead
by sending capability inside each packet, we establish a state
at the intermediate nodes using the concept of transaction
identifier.
A node sending the packet creates a unique identifier and
assigns one of its capabilities for each communication session
it participates in. The node informs about the association
between the transaction identifier and the associated capability
to the intermediate nodes. This mapping is kept at the inter-
mediate nodes in its capability database. All the subsequent
packets contain only the transaction identifier. Intermediate
nodes verify the packet against the capability using this id
and drop the packet if there is a violation.
The capability database, which a table stored in memory at
the intermediate nodes, has the following entries.
Source node: The address of owner of the capability.
Transaction id: The unique id generated by the source node
for this communication.
Destination node: The address of the destination node.
Capability: A copy of the capability.
Statistics: A structure maintained to enforce the bandwidth
limitation of the capability.
Each source node also maintains a table called transaction
table that maps the traffic session with transaction identifier,
capability and usage. This table is consulted before the packets
are sent for a traffic session.
A. Control packets
Control packets are used for exchange of capability in-
formation, as well as error reporting. Data packets can also
be piggybacked on control packets. A control packet can
have multiple messages embedded in it using type, length,
value (TLV) fields. The following control message types are
supported:
CAP-REQ message is used for establishing an entry in the
capability database of the nodes along the path from a source
to a destination. The message contains the source node address
(IDi), transaction id (TXir), destination node address (IDr),
flags and the capability (C). This message is signed with the
public key of the sender. The message also contains a smaller
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Fig. 2. Connection Establishment
public key that will be used to sign the subsequent packets.
Smaller keys are used to reduce the length of the signatures
in the packets as well as the processing time.
RECV-CAP message is used by a receiver (responder) for
sending a receiver capability back to the sender (initiator).
CAP-ERROR message is used for sending various error mes-
sages. The value in the message contains the error type. PUB-
KEY messages are used to advertise the public key of the
sender. DATA message is used for piggybacking the data
packets in the control messages. CAP-INFO messages are used
for retrieving the capability information after a route change.
B. Connection establishment
When an initiator node wants to enter a communication
session with a responder node, the former creates a transaction
identifier, associates a capability with it and adds it to the
transaction table. Then it sends the following control packet
to the responder: CAP-REQ[IDi, IDr, TXi, Ci], RECV-
CAP[{Cr}i]. Here IDi is the address of the initiator, IDr is
the address of the responder, TXi is the transaction identifier,
Ci is the forward capability of the initiator, {Cr}i is the
receiver capability assigned by the initiator to the responder
This packet consists of two message types. One is a
CAP-REQ message for establishing the capability entry at
the intermediate nodes. The optional second message type
is the receiver capability (RECV-CAP) for the responder to
communicate back with the initiator. If the responder already
have enough capability to communicate back with the initiator,
then RECV-CAP message need not be included. The control
packet may also contain a PUB-KEY message if the initiator
public key is not known to the nodes. The packet may also
piggyback the data using DATA message type.
The packet is send to the next neighbor (intermediate node)
using the underlying routing protocol. Each intermediate node
verifies the capability Ci and adds it to its capability database.
This entry in the capability database indicates that the packets
received from the initiator with transaction id TXi is to be
validated with capability Ci and they are destined for IDr.
The responder node, on receiving the connection request,
creates a transaction identifier for the communication and asso-
ciates it with either the received capability or another capabil-
ity it already possess. It also creates a receiver capability {Ci}r
for the initiator if the initiator has requested one. Consider the
case where the initiator had sent a receiver capability for the
responder and had requested for a receiver capability from the
responder. The responder sends the following control packet
to the initiator: CAP-REQ[IDr, IDi, TXr, {Cr}i], RECV-
CAP[{Ci}r]. Each intermediate node (not necessarily the
same as in the forward path) creates an entry in its capability
database from CAP-REQ message.
On receiving the response packet, the initiator forwards the
packet CAP-REQ[IDi, IDr, TXi, {Ci}r] to responder, so
that the capabilities are updated with the new capability {Ci}r
at the intermediate node. The intermediate nodes update the
capability database with the new capability.
The connection initiation sequence is shown in Figure 2.
For ease of representation, message types are omitted from the
figure. The boxes in the figure show the contents of capability
database.
C. Data transfer
The data packets are of following format.
IDi, IDr, TXi, < data >,< signature >
An intermediate node verifies the packet against the asso-
ciated capability before forwarding it. It also probabilistically
verifies the packet signature to prevent spoofing attacks.
D. Routing Changes
The route between two nodes can change, when the inter-
mediate nodes move in MANET. The new route may contain
new intermediate nodes that were not part of the initial
connection setup. After a route change, when an intermediate
node receives a data packet for which there is no capability
database entry, then the node requests for that entry from
the upstream node. The entry need to be verifiable by the
intermediate node to avoid spoofing attacks. This is illustrated
in Figure 3.
New intermediate node 3 is added to the path from the initia-
tor to the responder. When the data packet IDi, IDr, TXi, <
data > is received by node 3, it checks IDi, TXi in its
capability database. Since that entry is not present in its
database, node 3 drops the packets and sends a CAP-INFO
message requesting information about the capability associated
with that transaction id to the upstream node. If the upstream
node has the information in its capability database, it forwards
the corresponding entry to node 3 using a CAP-INFO response
message. Node 3 verifies the capability and installs the capa-
bility in its capability database. Hence the effect of routing
change is localized only to the neighborhood of the change
and does not affect the whole route. Future communication
using that transaction id can go uninterrupted.
If the upstream node does not have information about
the transaction id in its capability database when it receives
the CAP-INFO message, then it sends a CAP-NOT-FOUND
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Fig. 3. Route change
message to the source node. This can happen if multiple
consecutive nodes are involved in the route change. The source
node, on receiving that message, sends a new CAP-REQ
message to the destination node. All the intermediate nodes
in the route update their capability database on receiving this
message. The data transfer continues normally from this point.
Proactive approaches: Another approach for updating
node3’s capability database when a routing change happens
is for node 1 to proactively send the entry to node 3. This can
be done either when the node 1 detects the routing change,
or when the node 1 finds the first packet for the transaction
id after the routing change. Another approach could be that
the node 3 allows the data packets to pass through for a
short duration after a routing change, and gets the capability
information from the source node or an upstream node during
that time.
E. Capability refresh
Periodically, or when the capability is about to expire, the
end nodes (both initiator and responder) create new receiver
capabilities and send them to the other end. The nodes forward
the new capabilities along the forward path, so that the
intermediate nodes update their capability database with the
new capabilities. Capability refresh packets are also used for
updating the keys used for signing the data packets if the
communication sessions are of long duration, since we use
short keys for data packets.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We implemented our approach in the GloMoSim simula-
tor [1]. To that end, we extended GloMoSim by developing an
additional layer between the IP and AODV routing layer [24].
In this section, we compare the performance of capability-
based MANETs (referred as caprt) with a system that does not
use capabilities (referred as original). First, we use a simple
line topology, where seven nodes 0 through 6 are arranged
in a line 200 meters apart. We use this simple topology for
computing the basic overhead of our scheme, since it is easy
to analyze the results. Then, measure our system using more
complex and realistic networks.
In our experiments, we use the default radio parameters
of GloMoSim: radio range 376.782m and link bandwidth 2
Mbps. We use 802.11 as the MAC protocol. We introduce a


























Fig. 4. Latency of the first CBR packet of size 512 bytes
milliseconds. This is the time required to process 128-byte
packets on a 100 Mbps link. To protect the integrity of the
capability tokens and verify the identity of the sender and the
receiver, we employ 256-bit RSA for signing the individual
data packets and 1024-bit RSA for signing the capability itself.
This incurs an additional 36 bytes per data packet; 4 bytes
for the transaction identifier and 32 bytes for the signature.
Requests to issue a capability packets are always verified by
the intermediate nodes (relatively low traffic). However, to
improve the latency performance of our system, we chose
to verify data packets probabilistically (this can depend on
the path length). Upon detection of an unauthorized packet,
we can revert back to deterministic packet checking. The
cost of all packet operations are (per packet): inserting a
capability token (identifier) in the capability database costs an
average of 0.01 milliseconds and the record lookup operation
0.005 milliseconds. In addition, generating a signature requires
0.168 milliseconds and verification 0.0275 milliseconds for
data packets. Capability protocol packets requires 3.159ms for
signature generation and 0.140ms for signature verification. A
capability refresh packet is sent every 8 seconds. Simulations
were run on a Pentium-4 3.20GHz CPU with 1GB memory.
Each intermediate node verifies the signature of a packet
with probability 0.2063. Since this verification decision is
taken independently by each node, a signature of a packet is
verified by at least one node in a 3 hop path with probability
0.50 (i.e., 1-(1-0.2063)(1-0.2063)(1-0.2063)).
We implemented a token bucket algorithm to enforce the
bandwidth limitation at the intermediate nodes. Each of the
experiments below was run 20 times with different seed values,
and the average of the parameter of interest was taken.
A. Packet latency
First we compare the latency of the packets in our scheme
(denoted as caprt) with that of the one does not use the
capability based protection (denoted as original or org). We
send 1000 constant bit rate (CBR) packets of size 512 bytes
at 100 ms interval from a source node to a destination node
n hops away, where n = 1, . . . 6 in the line topology. We
measure the latency of the packet as the time from the creation

















































Fig. 6. CBR throughput
The latency of the first packet is larger than the rest of
the packets. This is because route needs to be discovered in
both the schemes and capability needs to be established in the
capability scheme. The packet processing for the capability
scheme also includes capability database lookup and proba-
bilistic verification of packet signatures.
Figure 4 shows the latency for the first packet to reach the
different destination nodes. The higher latency in capability
scheme is due to the capability establishment, capability
database lookup and signature verification as well as additional
overhead (36 bytes) in the packet. This average overhead is
35.8ms, 41.6ms and 60.9ms respectively for nodes 3, 4 and
5 hops away. The average overhead is 20.5%. The overhead
increases as hop length increase since the overhead is added
at each node. It can also be seen that the latency increases
considerably from 3 hops to 4 hops in both the schemes. This
is coming from AODV because AODV had to increment the
TTL once more and retransmit the RREQ packet while finding
the routes to the node that was 4 or 5 hops away. The same
is true for 6 nodes.
Figure 5 shows the average latency for all the 1000 packets
to reach the different destination nodes. Since there are large
number of packets, effect of the high latency of first packet is
minimized. Here the average overhead is only 0.6ms, 1.2ms
and 1.6ms respectively for nodes 3, 4 and 5 hops away. The






















Fig. 7. FTP throughput


























S2−D2  traffic2 S3−D3   traffic3
Fig. 8. Topology to study the mis-behaving nodes
B. Throughput
We compare the throughput of the capability scheme with
original scheme on an 802.11 network. We use the line
topology and pump large CBR packets (1400 bytes) at high
rate (every 1ms). We set the node 0 as the source of the CBR
traffic and send the traffic to destination nodes at different
hops. We measure the number of bytes received within one
minute from the start of the data transfer and compute the
data throughput. The results are shown in 6.
As expected, throughput of both the schemes decreases as
the number of hops in the path increases. The throughput of
capability scheme is only 2% lower than the original scheme.
C. TCP performance
To measure the performance of TCP on capability scheme,
we compare the throughput of FTP on both the schemes on
a line graph. An FTP client at node 0 transfers data to an
FTP server at 1, 2, . . . , 6 hops away. In each experiment the
client sends 10 application layer items of random sizes. The
application layer item sent was same for both the schemes
in the same experiment. The results are plotted in Figure 7.
The behavior of TCP performance is similar to that of CBR,
but at lower bandwidth due to TCP congestion control and
in-order guaranteed delivery. On average, TCP throughput for
the capability scheme is 5.3% lower than the original scheme.
D. Resilience against mis-behaving nodes
In this experiment, we study the attack resilience of the
capability based protocol. The topology for this experiment is
shown in Figure 8. There are three traffic sessions competing
for the bandwidth resources of the network. The traffic is CBR
packets of size 512 bytes send at packet intervals 40ms, 20ms
and 10ms respectively by S1, S2 and S3. Each of the nodes



























































Fig. 10. Number of packets received by the destination after the route change
The results are shown in Figure 9. Even though traffic3
is four times the traffic1 and two times the traffic2, each of
them gets the same bandwidth initially. Any increase in the
allocated bandwidth after reaching the bandwidth of traffic1,
give the same increase for both traffic2 and traffic3. Then
traffic2 gets saturated. After that traffic3 bandwidth increases
till that also gets saturated. We see that the number of bytes
received slightly less than the allocated bandwidth since the
UDP/IP and capability headers are not counted as part of the
bytes received.
E. Mobility
We study the effect of mobility on capability scheme. Since
the nodes keep soft state about the capabilities, when the route
changes due to node mobility, the new node needs to receive
the capability information about existing sessions.
Figure 10 shows the effect of mobility on number of packets
received for various inter packet intervals. In this experiment,
1000 CBR packets of 512 bytes were sent to a node 3 hops
away starting at time 0. At time 0.5 seconds, node at 2 hops
away was removed and a new node introduced. Figure 10
shows the number of packets received at the destination for
both the schemes, with and without this mobility. The number
of packets received reduces as the packet interval reduces due
to limitation in throughput. As expected, the number of packets
lost due to mobility increases at lower inter packet interval.
On average, capability scheme loses 155ms worth of traffic;
3-93 6-96 30-39 60-69
FTP Original 16395 15546 14759 14694Capability 14062 17722 14176 15147
CBR
Original 65711 162293 57535 177303
Capability 54113 148027 57793 148153
Ltd bw capability 129164 131437 129844 134230
CBR Original 74124 150718 52510 157779
Mobility Capability 59864 117728 57933 129347
Ltd bw capability 113111 136975 100924 138040
TABLE I
FTP AND CBR THROUGHPUT (BPS) ON A GRID TOPOLOGY
where as original scheme loses 108ms worth of traffic. The
higher loss is due to the need for getting the capability related
information by the new node in the path from the source.
F. Grid Topology
We next use a grid topology containing 100 nodes (10x10
grid), each nodes 300m apart. We ran four ftp sessions, two
of them from the nodes on the top of the grid to bottom of
the grid; between nodes pairs (3, 93) and (6, 96). The other
two ftp session were from left to right between node pairs
(30, 39) and (60, 69). We also ran CBR traffic of 1400 bytes
with 10ms packet interval for those source destination pairs
and computed throughput.
Table I shows the average throughput of the four sessions,
for both FTP and CBR. As it can be seen, the average
throughput of the schemes are comparable. Capability scheme
throughput is only 0.5% lower for FTP and 11.8% lower for
CBR compared to the original scheme.
CBR experiment in the table contains 3 rows. The original
scheme does not limit the bandwidth a node can use. The
capability scheme in the second row allowed capability to use
unlimited bandwidth. In both cases two of the sessions get
most of the bandwidth. In the third experiment, the capabilities
had limited bandwidth. In this case, each of the sessions
received a fair share of the available bandwidth.
The last set of rows shows the effect of mobility in both
the schemes. In this set of experiments, the second node in
the route from source to destination of all the traffic pairs
were removed after 2 seconds. The average throughput of the
capability scheme was 16.1% less than the original scheme.
This reduction is more than the CBR traffic without mobility.
This is because the capability scheme needs more time to
restore, due to need for restoring the capability database in the
new route. The last row shows the results when the capability
had a limited bandwidth. Here the average bandwidth dropped
by 6.8% compared to capability scheme without mobility.
VI. RELATED WORK
Security for mobile ad hoc network is an active area of
research. In this section we give a sample of work in this
area. Surveys of research in MANETs can be found in [31],
[32], [26].
The concept of capabilities was used in operating system
for securing resources [30]. There was work on allowing
controlled exposure of resources at the network layer using
the concept of ”visas” for packets [10], which is similar to
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network capabilities. More recently, network capabilities were
proposed to prevent DoS in wired networks in [3].
Key management is an important building block of any
security system. There are various schemes proposed in lit-
erature for establishing symmetric keys between a pair of
nodes, in the presence of a central authority by random pre-
allocation of key shares [9], [5], [17], [7], [36]. They are
particularly useful for sensor networks, which has limited
memory and computing [25]. Many papers have addressed
public key distribution under the assumption of unavailability
or compromised certificate authority [35], [15]. Research also
attempted to secure data and global time in the presence of
malicious nodes [6], [37], [27]. Securing the routing protocols
in MANET is an active area of research [19]. Solutions are
proposed to protect the routing protocol like DSR, with the
help of cryptographically signing the messages [13]. The
solutions are also proposed for preventing specific routing
attacks like worm hole, rushing attack etc [12], [33], [11].
Secure network and transport protocol are also proposed in
mobile and multi-homing environment [21].
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) for MANETs is also an
active area of research [20]. Various distributed IDS architec-
tures are proposed for resource constrained MANETs [2], [34].
Solutions are also proposed to specifically detect the attacks
on routing protocol based on the protocol specification [14],
[28], [8] and mechanisms to respond to those attacks [29].
There is rich literature on detecting denial of service and node
replication attacks on sensor networks [18], [22]. Reputation
mechanism is also proposed in MANETs to guard against
selfish nodes [16].
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a novel architecture for enforcing security
policies in MANETs. This scheme is based on the concept of
network capabilities, and can protect both end-host resources
and network bandwidth from denial of service attacks, as well
as limit the exposure of the MANET to a compromised node.
We showed the details of the capability propagation protocol
and discussed the various scenarios of use. Our simulation
results show that the impact of the scheme is minimal on
throughput and latency, in spite of using cryptographic op-
erations. For our future work, we plan to study the impact
of our scheme on larger topologies and classes of traffic. In
addition, we would like to quantify the resilience of the scheme
in the presence of misbehaving nodes and the performance of
multicast traffic on mobility scenarios, and to implement and
deploy on MANET testbeds with real traffic.
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